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A decline in governmental distortions to agricultural and other trade since the 1980s has 
contributed to economic growth and poverty alleviation globally. But new modeling results 
suggest that has taken the world only three-fifths of the way towards freeing merchandise 
trade, and that farm policies are responsible for 70 percent of the global welfare cost of 
remaining distortions to goods markets as of 2004. Meanwhile, new drivers are affecting the 
mean and variance of world prices of farm products, including biofuel mandates and 
subsidies, climate change mitigation policies and adaptation, water institution and policy 
developments, difficulties in concluding a multilateral Doha Round agricultural agreement at 
the WTO, and policies relating to transgenic foods. This paper reviews trends and 
fluctuations in past distortions to agricultural incentives, speculates on how they might evolve 
in coming decades alongside other market developments, and draws out implications for 
Australia. 
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Agricultural protection and subsidies in high-income (and some middle-income) countries 
have been depressing international prices of farm products for many decades. This has been 
lowering the earnings of farmers and associated rural businesses in developing countries and 
food-exporting countries such as Australia and New Zealand, and may have added to global 
inequality and poverty because three-quarters of the world’s poorest people depend directly 
or indirectly on agriculture for their main income. In addition to that external policy influence 
on rural poverty, however, the governments of many developing countries have directly taxed 
their farmers over much of the past half-century, have overvalued their currency, and have 
pursued an import-substituting industrialization strategy by restricting imports of 
manufactures (as was the case in Australia and New Zealand too up to the 1980s). Together 
those measures indirectly taxed producers of other tradable products in developing 
economies, by far the most numerous of them being farmers (Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 
1988, 1991). As a result there has been over-production of farm products in high-income 
countries and under-production in more-needy developing countries. It also means there has 
been less international trade in farm products than would have been the case under free trade, 
thereby thinning markets for these weather-dependent products and thus making them more 
volatile. Using a stochastic model of world food markets, Tyers and Anderson (1992, Table 
6.14) found that instability of international food prices in the 1980s was three times greater 
than it would have been under free trade in those products.  
Numerous countries have begun to reform their agricultural price and trade policies 




distortions to global markets for farm products, a recent World Bank research project 
examined policies affecting agricultural price incentives since 1955 in 75 countries that 
together account for more than 90 percent of the world’s population and agricultural GDP 
(Anderson 2009). This paper first reviews those trends and fluctuations in past distortions to 
agricultural incentives before speculating on how they might evolve in coming decades 
alongside other key market developments. It begins with a summary of the methodology used 
to generate annual indicators of the extent of government interventions in markets. The 
indicators are then summarized across regions over the period since the mid-1950s. Results 
from a global economy-wide model provide quantification of the impacts on global 
agricultural trade and economic welfare of the reforms since the early 1980s and of the 
policies still in place as of 2004. New estimates of the impacts of 2004 policies on income 
inequality and poverty in developing countries are summarized as well, before discussing 
prospects for further reform. The paper concludes by drawing out implications for Australia 
and for areas of further research on agricultural trade. 
 
Methodology for measuring the extent of price distortions  
 
Government-imposed distortions can create a gap between domestic prices and what they 
would be under free markets. The Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for each farm product 
was computed as part of the recent World Bank research project (see Anderson 2009) as the 
percentage by which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what 
they would be without the government’s intervention (or lowered them, if NRA<0). A 
weighted average NRA for all covered products (an average of almost a dozen per country so 
as to cover more than two-thirds of the gross value of national farm production) was derived 




consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) computed by OECD (2008), which are 
expressed as a percentage of the distorted price). To that NRA for covered products is added 
a ‘guesstimate’ of the NRA for non-covered products (on average around 30 percent of the 
total value of farm production) and an estimate of the NRA from non-product-specific forms 
of assistance or taxation.
1
Also computed is a production-weighted average NRA for nonagricultural tradables, 
for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the calculation of a percentage Relative 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the 
agricultural (including non-covered) and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.
 Each farm industry is classified either as import-competing, or a 
producer of exportables, or as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing 
over the years), so as to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two 
different groups of covered tradable farm products.  
2
  The extent to which consumers are taxed or subsidized also is examined by the World 
Bank project. To do so, a Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE) is calculated by comparing the 
 Since the 
NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA 
(since the weighted average NRAnonag
t is non-negative in all our country case studies). And 
if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. This measure is useful in that if 
it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to 
which a country’s sectoral policy regime has an anti- (pro-)agricultural bias (Anderson et al. 
2008).  
                                                 
1 Since the 1980s governments of some high-income countries have also provided so-called ‘decoupled’ 
assistance to farmers but, because that support in principle does not distort resource allocation, its NRA has been 
computed separately and is not included for direct comparison with the NRAs for other sectors or for developing 
countries. 
2 Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives nonagricultural 
producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance that affect 
producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved 
that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model 




price that consumers pay for their food and the international price of each food product at the 
border. Differences between the NRA and the CTE arise from distortions in the domestic 
economy that are caused by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies that cause the prices paid by 
consumers (adjusted to the farmgate level) to differ from those received by producers. In the 
absence of any other information, the CTE for each tradable farm product is assumed to be 
the same as the NRA from border distortions.  
The cost of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource 
misallocation tends to be greater the greater the variation of NRAs across industries within 
the sector. A simple indicator of dispersion is the standard deviation of the covered 
industries’ NRAs. However, it is helpful to have a single indicator of the overall welfare 
effect of each country’s regime of agricultural price distortions in place at any time, and to 
trace its path over time and make cross-country comparisons. To that end, the family of 
indexes first developed by Anderson and Neary (2005) under the catch-all name of trade 
restrictiveness indexes has been drawn upon to generate indicators of distortions imposed by 
each country’s agricultural policies on its economic welfare, and also on its agricultural trade. 
Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) define and estimate a Welfare Reduction Index (WRI) 
and a Trade Reduction Index (TRI) for the same 75 countries, taking into account the fact 
that for some covered products the NRA and CTE differ. As their names suggest, these two 
new indexes respectively capture in a single indicator the direct welfare- or trade-reducing 
effects of distortions to consumer and producer prices of covered farm products from all 
agricultural and food price and trade policy measures in place. Specifically, the TRI (or WRI) 
is that ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied uniformly to all farm commodities in a 
country that year would generate the same reduction in trade (or economic welfare) as the 
actual cross-commodity structure of agricultural NRAs and CTEs for that country, other 




The WRI measure reflects the partial equilibrium welfare cost of agricultural price-
distorting policies better than the NRA because it recognizes that the welfare cost of a 
government-imposed price distortion is related to the square of the price wedge. It thus 
captures the disproportionately higher welfare costs of peak levels of assistance or taxation, 
and is larger than the mean NRA/CTE and is positive regardless of whether the government’s 
agricultural policy is favoring or hurting farmers. In this way the WRI and TRI go somewhat 
closer to what a computable general equilibrium (CGE) can provide in the way of estimates 
of the trade and welfare (and other) effects of the price distortions captured by the product 
NRA and CTE estimates – and they have the advantage over a CGE model of providing an 
annual time series. 
 
Estimates of the changing extent of agricultural price distortions  
 
A global summary of the new results from the World Bank project is provided in Figure 1. It 
confirms the concern expressed by D. Gale Johnson in his seminal book of 1973 that 
agricultural prices in developing countries were set well below international levels and that 
high-income countries were increasingly protecting their farmers. It also reveals that those 
patterns changed in the latter 1980s: after peaking at more than 50 per cent, the average NRA 
for high-income countries has fallen somewhat, depending on the extent to which one 
believes that some new farm programs are ‘decoupled’ in the sense of no longer influencing 
production decisions (see dashed line in Figure 1). For developing countries, by contrast, the 
average (negative) NRA for agriculture has been rising since the 1980s and, since the latter 
1990s, has been slightly above zero.  
The average NRA for developing countries conceals the fact that the exporting and 




while the average NRA for exporters has been negative throughout (going from below −30 
per cent prior to the latter 1980s to almost zero in 2000-04), the NRA for import-competing 
farmers in developing countries has been positive and fluctuating around a rising trend 
(spiking at 40 per cent in the mid-1980s period of low international prices). The anti-trade 
bias within agriculture (the effective taxing of both exports and imports of farm products) for 
developing countries has diminished since the mid-1980s, but the gap between the NRA 
averages of the import-competing and export subsectors is still around 20 percentage points. 
The straight-line regressions in Figure 2 also reveals that the trend NRA for import-
competing farmers in developing countries has increased at virtually the same pace as that in 
high-income countries. This suggests that growth in agricultural protection from import 
competition is something that begins at low levels of per capita income rather than being a 
phenomenon exclusive to high-income countries.  
The improvement in farmers’ incentives in developing countries is understated by the 
above NRA estimates, because those countries have also reduced their assistance to 
producers of non-agricultural tradable goods, most notably manufactures. The decline in the 
weighted average NRA for the latter, depicted as the upper line in Figure 3a, was greater than 
the increase in the average NRA for tradable agricultural sectors for the period to the mid-
1980s but since the mid-1980s the changes in the NRAs of both sectors have contributed 
almost equally to the improvement in incentives to farmers. As a resulty, the relative rate of 
assistance (RRA) for developing countries as a group went from −46 per cent in the second 
half of the 1970s to 1 per cent in 2000-04. This increase (from a coefficient of 0.54 to 1.01) is 
equivalent to an almost doubling in the relative price of farm products, which is a huge 




and Valdés (1988, 1991) just two decades ago.
3 This is mostly because of the changes in 
Asia, but even for Latin America this relative price hike is one-half, while for Africa this 
indicator improves by only one-eighth. As for high-income countries, assistance to 
manufacturing was on average much less than assistance to farmers, even in the 1950s, and 
its decline since then has had only a minor impact on that group’s average RRA (Figure 3b).
4
It is the move from negative to positive RRAs for China and India that matter most 
for the world. Both countries have remained very close to self sufficient in agricultural 
products over the past four decades, and the steady rise in their RRAs has contributed to that 
outcome. It may also have helped ensure that the trend in China’s ratio of urban to rural mean 
incomes (adjusted for cost of living differences) has been flat since 1980 (Ravallion and Chen 
2007, Figure 3), and that the Gini coefficient for India hardly changed between 1984 and 
2004 (World Bank 2008). A major question, addressed at the end of the paper, is: will those 
countries’ RRAs remain at their current neutral level of close to zero, or will they continue to 
rise in the same way as observed in Korea and Taiwan and, before them, in Japan and 
Western Europe?  
 
Turning to the single partial equilibrium indicators of the impact of agricultural 
distortions on national economic welfare and trade, the estimates by Lloyd, Croser and 
Anderson (2010) indicate that the trade-reducing impact of agricultural policies for 
developing countries as a group was roughly constant until the late 1980s and thereafter it 
declined, while for high-income countries the TRI first rose and then declined equally rapidly 
from the latter 1980s (Figure 4(a)). The TRI for developing countries is driven by the 
exportables subsector which was being taxed until recently and the import-competing 
subsector which was, and is increasingly, being protected (albeit less than in high-income 
                                                 
3 See Anderson (2010a) for a direct comparison of their estimates with the most recent ones by the World Bank. 
4 Australia and New Zealand were clear exceptions, where manufacturing protection had been very high and its 
decline occurred several decades later than in other high-income countries (Anderson, Lloyd and MacLaren 




countries – see Figure 2 above). For high-income countries, policies have supported both 
exporting and import-competing agricultural products and, even though they strongly favour 
the latter, the assistance to exporters has offset somewhat the anti-trade bias from the 
protection of those countries’ import-competing producers.  
The WRI estimates, shown in Figure 4(b), indicate a steady rise from the 1960s to the 
1980s but some decline in the 1990s. This reflects the fact that NRAs for high-income and 
developing countries diverged (in opposite directions) away from zero in the first half of the 
period under study and then converged toward zero in the most recent quarter-century. The 
global weighted average NRA thus traces out a fairly flat trend whereas the global WRI 
traces out a hill-shaped path and thus provides a less misleading indicator of the trend in 
resource misallocation in world agricultural markets. 
There is a great deal of NRA diversity also across commodities within each 
economy’s farm sector, and the extent (as measured by the standard deviation) has not 
diminished over the past five decades. Hence the WRIs are generally much higher than the 
NRAs. This suggests there is still much that could be gained from improved resource 
reallocation both between economies and within the agricultural sector of individual 
economies, were differences in rates of assistance to be reduced. 
  To summarize, one of the most salient features of agricultural price and trade policies 
in the world since the 1950s is the growth in distortions in the first half of that period and the  
major economic reforms since. Overall levels of non-agricultural protection have declined 
considerably, which has improved the competitiveness of the agricultural sector in many 
developing economies – just as it has in Australia and New Zealand. Two other salient 
features in developing countries have been the gradual policy movement away from taxing 
agricultural exportables,  but at the same time – and in contrast to non-agriculture – a rise in 




resource use within agriculture even in countries with an average NRA for agriculture and a 
RRA close to zero. In particular, an anti-trade bias in assistance rates within the farm sector 
remains in place. This may be understandable from a political economy viewpoint (see, e.g., 
Krueger 1990), but it nonetheless means that resources continue to be allocated inefficiently 
within the farm sector and, since openness tends to promote economic growth, that total 
factor productivity growth in developing country agriculture is slower than it would be if 
remaining interventions were removed. 
 
Effects of past reforms and of remaining policies: results from economy-wide modelling  
 
What have been the net economic effects of agricultural price and trade policy changes 
around the world since the early 1980s? And how do those effects on global markets, farm 
incomes and economic welfare compare with the effects of policy distortions that were still in 
place as of 2004? Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009) use a global 
economy-wide model known as Linkage (van der Mensbrugghe 2005) to provide a combined 
retrospective and prospective analysis that sought to assess how far the world had come, and 
how far it still has to go, in rectifying the disarray in world agriculture. It quantifies the 
impacts both of past reforms and of current policies by comparing the effects of the recent 
World Bank project’s distortion estimates for the period 1980-84 with those of 2004.  
Several key findings from that economy-wide modelling study are worth 
emphasizing. First, the policy reforms from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s is estimated to 
have improved global economic welfare by $233 billion per year, and removing the 
distortions remaining as of 2004 would add another $168 billion per year. This suggests that 
in a global welfare sense the world moved three-fifths of the way towards global free trade in 




magnitude to the extent of the decline in the partial equilibrium Welfare Reduction Index 
shown in Figure 4b. 
Second, developing countries benefited proportionately more than high-income 
economies (1.0 percent compared with 0.7 percent of national income) from those past policy 
reforms, and would gain nearly twice as much as high-income countries by completing that 
reform process (an average increase of 0.9 percent compared with 0.5 percent for high-
income countries). Of those prospective welfare gains from global liberalization, 70 percent 
would come from agriculture and food policy reform. This is a striking result given that the 
shares of agriculture and food in global GDP and global merchandise trade are only 3 and 6 
percent, respectively. The contribution of farm and food policy reform to the prospective 
welfare gain for just developing countries is even slightly greater, at 72 percent. 
Third, the share of global farm production exported (excluding intra-European Union 
(EU) trade) in 2004 has been slightly smaller as a result of those reforms since 1980-84, 
because of less farm export subsidies: the 8 per cent share for agriculture in 2004 contrasts 
with the 31 per cent share for other primary products and the 25 per cent for all other goods. 
If the policies distorting goods trade in 2004 were removed, the share of global production of 
farm products that is exported would rise from 8 to 13 per cent, thereby reducing instability 
of international prices and the quantities of those products traded. 
Fourth, the developing countries’ share of the world’s primary agricultural exports 
rose from 43 to 55 percent, and its farm output share from 58 to 62 percent, because of those 
reforms, with rises in nearly all agricultural industries except rice and sugar. Removing 
remaining goods market distortions would boost their export and output shares to 64 and 65 
percent, respectively. 
Fifth, for developing countries as a group, net farm income (value added in 




of the past quarter century, which is more than ten times the proportional gain for non-
agriculture. If policies remaining in 2004 were removed, net farm incomes in developing 
countries would rise a further 5.6 percent, compared with just 1.9 percent for non-agricultural 
value added. As well, returns to unskilled workers in developing countries – the majority of 
whom work on farms – would rise more than returns to other productive factors from that 
liberalization. The impact on sectoral incomes would be even starker in Australia, where 
agricultural GDP would rise 13 percent compared with only 2 percent for non-agricultural 
GDP. This would help most rural regions of Australia, thereby offsetting the adverse impact 
on them of Australia’s on-going mining boom (Anderson, Geisecke and Valenzuela 2010).  
Together, these findings suggest that international inequality and global poverty could 
be alleviated by further farm policy reform, given that three-quarters of the world’s poor are 
farmers in developing countries. To examine that issue more carefully, the World Bank 
research project undertook some economy-wide studies using global and national models 
with detailed household information (Anderson, Cockburn and Martin 2010a,b). In doing so, 
careful consideration was given to impacts on household income and expenditure. The fact 
that the poorest households in the poorest countries are concentrated in agriculture means 
those households are likely to benefit from farm producer price increases engendered by trade 
policy reform, other things equal. However, the outcome is not certain because poor 
households also spend the majority of their income on staple foods (Cranfield et al. 2003), so 
if food prices rise as a consequence of reform then this adverse effect on household 
expenditure may more than offset any beneficial effect of higher earnings. Also, the urban 
poor would be adversely affected by a rise in consumer prices of staple food, which may be 
more or less than offset by any induced rise in the demand for their unskilled labor. 
The approach adopted in the Anderson, Cockburn and Martin (2010a) study to 




Hertel and Winters (2005, 2006) in their study of the poverty consequences of a prospective 
Doha round agreement under the WTO. The new country case studies examine full unilateral 
reforms that individual developing countries might implement, the effects of which are 
compared with what full liberalization abroad would generate, so as to be able to assess the 
relative importance domestically for each nation of own-country policies as distinct from 
those of other countries. The national CGE models are able on their own to estimate the 
effects of unilateral reform of agricultural or all merchandise trade-distorting policies. The 
World Bank’s global Linkage model was chosen to provide the national modelers with 
estimates of the effects of other countries’ policies (amended to incorporate above estimates 
of agricultural distortions).  
As found in previous studies, whether based on ex post econometrics (as in Harrison 
2007) or ex ante economy-wide simulation (as in Hertel and Winters 2006), the results are 
mixed and so not easy to summarize, particularly with regard to the poverty effects. There is 
nonetheless a high degree of similarity in the most important sign: the extreme poverty 
alleviating effect of freeing all merchandise trade globally. Furthermore, this beneficial 
impact of full liberalization of global merchandise trade on the world’s poor would come 
more from agricultural than non-agricultural policy reform; and, within agriculture, more 
from the removal of substantial support provided to farmers in high-income countries than 
from developing country policy reform. Such reform would raise real earnings of unskilled 
workers in developing countries, most of whom work in agriculture. Their earnings would 
rise relative to both unskilled workers in developed countries and to other income earners in 
developing countries. This would thus reduce inequality both within developing countries and 
between developing and high-income countries, in addition to reducing poverty. Full trade 
liberalization of all goods, or just of agricultural products, also would cause inequality to 




countries, and both for own-country and rest-of-world reform. Inequality within the rural or 
urban household groupings would not alter much following full trade reform, suggesting that 
trade reform’s predominant distributional impact would be to reduce urban-rural inequality.  
   
What next? 
 
The prospects for further policy reform will be conditioned in part on developments in 
markets for farm and other products. On the demand side, the projected uneven growth in 
national populations and per capita incomes for coming decades is likely to be in relatively 
low-income countries including China and India. This implies significant changes to the 
economic centres of gravity of food and livestock feed consumption in the global economy, 
given that price and income elasticities of demand for food tend to decline with per capita 
income and earlier for lower-valued foods such as staple grains and tubers than for livestock 
and horticultural products. On its own this change is likely to put upward pressure on 
international prices of farm products. 
  Another important development on the demand side has to do with the new linkage 
between markets for fossil fuels and biofuel sources of energy. The rising user price of fossil 
fuels from 2003, together with concerns about the effect of burning such fuels on climate 
change, led the US and EU governments to provide user subsidies and to mandate a certain 
degree of use of biofuels. With those policies in place, it has become privately profitable for 
such products as corn, sugar and oilseeds to be used as inputs into ethanol or biodiesel – and 
for food and energy raw material prices to move together much more than in the past 9see 
Figure 5). If the user price of crude petroleum (including the price of carbon emissions) 
remains at historically high levels as is assumed by the International Energy Agency (2009) 




possibly continue, adding to the upward pressure on their prices.
5
On the supply side of the market for farm products, there is the possibility of 
technological catch-up by lagging regions through faster generation and importation of 
modern farm technologies, for example via the Green Revolution for Africa initiative of the 
Gates and Rockefeller Foundations. The new agricultural biotechnology revolution can 
contribute to that if government regulations and consumer sentiment allow, including through 
partnerships between public sector researchers and private life science firms. Policies towards 
transgenic crops have already caused major transformations of much of the cropping in North 
and South America; and biotech food crop policy reforms that began in China in 2010 
(allowing field experiments in Bt rice) may soon spread to other crops and other developing 
countries. Such reforms are likely to be necessary, though, to reduce the prospect of global 
crop yields falling in the wake of the slowdown in agricultural R&D over the past two 
decades and the diversion of more of the remaining funds towards conserving natural 
resources and the environment (Alston, Beddow and Pardey 2009).  
 And to the extent biofuel 
mandates are inflexible, they could add to the volatility of international prices of food 
because that component of demand will not be price-responsive.  
Also affecting supply trends is climate change. Its effects on aggregate global 
agricultural production and its location across countries and regions without and with 
mitigation and adaptation are great unknowns, not least because there are many possible 
government policy responses unilaterally and multilaterally. Moreover, the uncertainties 
about what policy instruments will be adopted by whom and when will be spread over 
decades rather than just the next few years. Land use undoubtedly will be affected non-
trivially; carbon credits and emissions trading will have unknown and possibly major effects 
                                                 
5 The cost of fuel and fertilizer needed to produce crops will rise with petroleum prices as well though, making 
biofuels less competitive than otherwise. Also, biofuels probably have a higher carbon footprint than most other 
renewable energy sources, and so over time governments may be dissuaded from continuing with biofuel 




depending among other things on whether/how/when agriculture and forestry are included in 
the schemes of various countries, as will any border tax adjustments or other sanctions 
imposed on imports from countries deemed to be not sharing the burden of reducing 
greenhouse gases; crop yield fluctuations will be greater because of weather volatility and 
especially more extreme weather events, leading to further triggers for trade policy 
interventions aimed at stabilizing domestic food markets; and so on. The literature on these 
and myriad other ways in which agricultural markets are expected to be affected directly and 
indirectly by climate change and associated policy and technological responses is growing 
exponentially. One of the more widely cited is by Cline (2007), who predicts that by the 
2080s, even with carbon fertilization, agricultural output will be 8 percent lower in 
developing countries, 8 percent higher in high-income countries, and 3 percent lower 
globally. Projections in a more recent study by IFPRI, assuming no carbon fertilization, 
suggest that by 2050 climate change will have had only a little downward impact on coarse 
grain production but will have reduced global rice production by one-eighth and wheat by 
one-quarter globally and nearly one-third in developing countries (Nelson et al. 2009). 
True, climate mitigation policies could have an adverse effect on industrialization in 
the more advanced developing countries such as China and lead to their agricultural sector in 
aggregate benefitting indirectly (Mattoo et al. 2009), but the consensus nonetheless seems to 
be that expected climate change over the coming decades and its impact on water availability 
and demand will add to the difficulty of growth in global supplies of farm products 
outstripping growth in demand this century, in contrast to the 20
th century. The World Bank 
(2010), for example, forecasts that its index of real international agricultural prices in 2020 
will be about 50 percent above its level in 2000; and Nelson et al. (2009, Table 2) expect real 
international prices of grain and livestock in 2050 would be between 35 and 70 percent 




with climate change even with carbon fertilization. Bearing in mind that the food price index 
in 2009 was about 70 percent above its 2000 level (Figure 5), those projections suggest 
climate change could be enough to prevent real food prices from falling over the next four 
decades. 
  Bearing in mind the above expected developments in markets for farm products, how 
might agricultural price-distorting policies evolve over the coming decades? If the reform 
processes of the past quarter century continue, such that national RRAs converge towards 
zero (from below by most developing countries and from above by higher-income countries), 
there would continue to be a re-location of global farm production (in global share terms) 
from high-income to developing countries, reversing the policy distortion-driven opposite 
trend in the quarter century prior to the mid-1980s. Whether that would tend to push 
international food prices up or down depends on the relative size of the two groups of 
countries and which had the larger RRA change (bearing in mind that some export 
restrictions still remain, including in Argentina). According to the global CGE modeling 
exercise outlined in the previous section, if all goods market distortions as of 2004 were 
removed globally the net change in international prices would be very small – but, 
international markets would be ‘thicker’ because of such reform so their volatility from year 
to year would be less than otherwise, boosting global food security. 
  Such a policy scenario would imply that the early 1960s to the mid-1980s was an 
aberrant period of welfare-reducing policy divergence (negative and very low RRAs in newly 
independent developing countries, positive and rising RRAs in most high-income countries) 
that has given way to growth-enhancing, welfare-improving and inequality- and poverty-
reducing reforms. In this view the reforms could be seen as the result of learning from the 




the increased variability of seasonal conditions due to climate change it is wiser for 
economies to be more open. 
An alternative interpretation of history is that it is the most recent 25-year period of 
RRA changes that is aberrant. The RRA declines in high-income countries, according to this 
alternative view, are associated more with, in the case of the EU, its 1992 Single Market 
initiative and subsequent EU enlargements than with external reform pressure from other 
World Trade Organization (WTO) members,
6
Moreover, in developing countries there are few signs of a slowdown of the upward 
trend in agricultural protection from import competition over the time period studied.
 and with the fact that the high protection rates 
of the mid-1980s represent a temporary spike above trend caused by the very low 
international commodity prices then, and conversely for the low rates in 2007-08 reported by 
the OECD. As for the rise of developing country RRAs in this alternative view, that simply 
follows the example provided earlier by higher-income countries and will not stop when 
those RRAs reach zero. Inspection of the NRAs in Figure 2a for exporting and import-
competing sub-sectors of developing country agriculture reveals that the convergence of their 
aggregate NRAs to near zero is mainly with respect to the exporting sub-sector. NRAs for 
import-competing farmers in developing countries, by contrast, are positive and (if one 
ignores the latter 1980s when international food prices spiked downwards) are trending 
upwards over time.  
7
                                                 
6 See Swinnen (2008). As explained by Josling (2009), the budgetary cost of continuing with the EU’s past 
levels of support would have sky-rocketed following the EU membership expansion eastwards, with little if any 
of those extra payments going to the traditional lobbyists for the CAP. 
 On the 
contrary, there are numerous signs that developing country governments want to keep open 
their options to raise agricultural NRAs in the future, particularly via import restrictions. One 
indicator is the high tariff bindings developing countries committed themselves to following 
7 True, applied tariffs were lowered or suspended as a way of dealing with the international food price spike in 
2008, but initial indications are that this, and the food export taxes or quantitative restrictions imposed that year 
by numerous food-exporting developing countries, lasted only until international prices returned close to their 




the Uruguay Round: as of 2001, actual applied tariffs on agricultural products averaged less 
than half the corresponding bound tariffs for developing countries of 48 percent, and less than 
one-sixth in the case of least-developed countries (Anderson and Martin 2006, table 1.2). 
Another indicator of agricultural trade reform reluctance is the unwillingness of many 
developing countries to agree to major cuts in bound agricultural tariffs in the WTO’s on-
going Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. More than that, the current negotiations 
have brought to prominence a new proposal for agricultural protectionism in developing 
countries. This is based on the notion that agricultural protection is helpful and needed for 
food security, livelihood security and rural development. This view has succeeded in bringing 
“Special Products” and a “Special Safeguard Mechanism” into the multilateral trading 
system’s agricultural negotiations, despite the fact that such policies, which would raise 
domestic food prices in developing countries, may worsen poverty and the food security of 
the poor (Ivanic and Martin 2008). 
These two alternative interpretations of history have profoundly different implications 
for the future. The first suggests that the WTO’s Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations is likely to conclude with substantial cuts to agricultural tariff and subsidy 
bindings that lock in recent reforms and go close to relegating protectionism in agricultural 
markets to history. In that case world food price trends would simply depend on whether 
improvements in farm versus nonfarm technologies could keep pace with the growth in 
global demand for farm products. That was certainly possible in the 20
th century (see 
Pfaffenzeller, Newbolt and Rayner 2007) but, given the pace of climate change and the recent 
growth in demand for biofuels, it may be more of a challenge in the 21
st century especially if 
much of the world continues to shun genetically modified food. In particular, the emerging 




to rapidly industrialize, should their RRAs cease rising and instead stay at their present near-
zero levels.  
The other interpretation of history – one that views as normal a movement from 
taxing to subsidizing farmers as an economy develops – suggests the Doha Round will 
struggle to reach an ambitious reform outcome in agriculture, and that developing countries 
will make use of the legal wiggle room they have allowed themselves in their WTO bindings 
to follow Japan, Korea and Taiwan into higher levels of agricultural protection. In that case 
international food prices would rise less than in the first scenario, but domestic food prices in 
developing countries, particularly for importables, would rise relative to international prices. 
If this is the more realistic interpretation of history, it places much more weight on the role of 
the economics profession in contuning to expound the virtues of governments keeping out of 
markets that would otherwise function well, and limit themselves to overcoming market 
failures, such as the under-investment in agricultural R&D, improving institutions such as 
those needed to improve water property rights, offsetting externalities, and raising 
government revenue efficiently ( e.g. via value added taxation) to finance social programs 
that attract broad-based support (e.g. to reduce rural-urban inequality and poverty and thereby 
alleviate social unrest). Available evidence suggests that problems of rural-urban poverty 
gaps have been partly alleviated in parts of Asia and Africa by some of the more-mobile 
members of farm households finding full- or part-time work off the farm and repatriating part 
of their higher earnings back to those remaining in farm households (Otsuka and Yamano 
2006, Otsuka, Estudillo and Sawada 2009). Efficient ways of assisting any left-behind groups 




public goods that have high social payoffs such as basic education and health and rural 




Implications for Australia 
 
As a net exporter of many farm products, Australia would do relatively well from a freeing of 
remaining distortions to agricultural incentives globally. According to the global modeling 
results in Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009), its real GDP would rise at 
least as much as for other high-income countries from such liberalization (while New 
Zealand’s would be boosted far more per capita, because of it stronger export specialization 
in farm products). When the terms of trade improvement responsible for that income boost 
are imposed on a detailed regional model of the Australian economy, that national model 
reveals that most rural regions of Australia would benefit – but at the expense of the mining-
intensive regions (Anderson, Giesecke and Valenzuela 2010). Such a reform to world goods 
markets thus would offset the adverse effect on rural regions of (a) the on-going mining 
boom that has strengthened the Australian dollar so markedly over the past few years and (b) 
the expected adverse effect on Australian farm productivity from climate change over coming 
decades.
9
                                                 
8 Data in Pardey et al. (2006) suggest that public R&D expenditure in Asia since the late 1970s has averaged 
less than 0.5 percent of the gross value of production at undistorted prices, which is trivial compared with the 
NRA via price-distorting measures for Asia. Even if just one-twentieth of the current NRA provided to Asian 
farmers via farm price-support policies was replaced by agricultural R&D expenditure, that would more than 
double current public spending on such R&D – and the latter would increase regional economic welfare and the 
welfare of net buyers of food whereas price-raising policies reduce both. Such a boost to Asian R&D could well 
be able to generate another green revolution of the order of magnitude of the first one that began in the 1960s, 
especially if it took full advantage of the new developments in biotechnology (as shown for rice, for example, in 
Anderson, Jackson and Nielsen 2005).  
 Keeping the pressure on WTO members to bring the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations to a successful (that is, trade-liberalizing) conclusion should therefore continue 
to be a high priority for Australia. 
9 Gunasekera et al. (2008), for example, expect that, in the absense of mitigation and adaptation and ignoring 
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Figure 1: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in high-income, transition
a and  
developing countries, 1955 to 2004 


















a Denoted by the World Bank as ECA, for (Central and Eastern) Europe and Central Asia. 
























Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all covered 
agricultural products,
a high-income, transition and developing countries, 1955 to 2004 
(per cent)  
 
(a) Developing countries  
 
 
   (b) High-income countries plus Europe’s transition economies 
 
aCovered products only. The total also includes nontradables. The straight line in the upper 
segment of each graph is from an ordinary-least-squares regression based on annual NRA 
estimates. 
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Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable sectors and 
relative rate of assistance,
a developing and high-income countries, 1955 to 2004  
(per cent, farm production-weighted averages across countries) 





















(b) High-income countries 
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Figure 4 (continued): Trade and welfare reduction indexes for tradable farm products, by 
region, 1960 to 2007  
(percent) 
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Figure 5: International price indexes for food and fossil fuel energy raw materials 
 







Source; World Bank (2010). 